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The Tension Between a Godless Constitution and  
a Culture of Belief in an Age of Reason 
The Godless Constitution:  The Case  
Against Religious Correctness 
by Isaac Kramnick & R. Laurence Moore 
W.W. Norton & Co. (1997) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Would Pat Buchanan, a perennial favorite of the Religious 
Right, violate the Constitution if he said: “God wants you to 
vote for John Doe”? Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore in 
The Godless Constitution1 would answer this question “Yes!”2 If 
not the letter of the law, then certainly the spirit behind the 
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and the “No Reli-
gious Test” Clause of Article VI would be offended by such a 
statement.3 What then should be the role of religion in public 
life?4 Should religious leaders be involved in politics? Should 
voters consider a politician’s religious beliefs at the polls? 
The Godless Constitution proposes that the founding fathers 
 
 1. ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE 
CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS (paperback ed. 1997). 
 2.  “A Catholic bishop is within his rights to urge Catholics to support a consti-
tutional amendment banning abortion, but he steps ever [sic] the line separating 
church and state if he declares it a sin for Catholics to vote for candidate X.” Id. at 9. 
 3.  See also Michael A. Berg, The Religious Right, Constitutional Values, and the 
Lemon Test, 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37, 39 (1995) (“The intrusion of religion into the 
public sphere can be lamented and politically opposed, even if religiously motivated 
advocacy is itself constitutionally protected. While political argument in religious terms 
may offend constitutional values, governmental policy-making that serves religious 
ends is flatly unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.”). 
 4.  For example, should the strong religious beliefs of a judge disqualify him or 
her from participation in a case involving abortion? The Ninth Circuit addressed this 
issue in Feminist Women’s Health Center v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 1995) and 
decided that they should not. 
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deliberately omitted any reference to God in the Constitution in 
order to “build an impenetrable wall of separation between 
things sacred and civil.”5 Kramnick and Moore argue that the 
founding fathers relied heavily on Enlightenment the-
ory generally,6 and the writings of John Locke specifically, in 
drafting the Constitution. The result was to create a country 
where “Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,”7 and 
where any person may hold public office, regardless of his or 
her religion or even irreligion.8 This figurative wall, according 
to the authors, is violated when religious groups become too vo-
cal in politics, seek to legislate the individual conscience, sup-
port specific candidates solely because of their religion, and en-
courage others to do the same. 
The current state of the “impregnable wall” of church-state 
separation, according to Kramnick and Moore, resembles Swiss 
cheese.9 They attribute the glaring gaps in the wall to the vigi-
lant and vigilante Christian Right, represented by groups like 
the Christian Coalition and leaders like Pat Robertson, Ralph 
Reed, and Pat Buchanan. Consequently, Kramnick and Moore 
dub the so-called “religious” or “Christian” right the party of 
“religious correctness,” turning the concept of “political correct-
ness” on its head.10 
The authors argue that the Christian Right violates the 
spirit of the Establishment Clause, if not the text, by its im-
permissible entrance into politics.11 Kramnick and Moore con-
cede that religious leaders have every right to become involved 
in politics, run for office, sit on school boards, etc.; however, 
they believe that the wall is breached when religious leaders 
claim that their political party, or a specific political candidate, 
 
 5.  KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 83. 
 6.  See also Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453, 466 (1996) 
(“[V]irtually all of the Framers—and indeed the entire founding generation—shared a 
common background in the epistemology of the Enlightenment. That epistemology was 
based on reason and empiricism, specifically rejecting faith and revelation.”). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 8. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a 
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”). 
 9. Cf. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW 
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 109 (1993) (suggesting that “in order to 
make the Founder’s vision compatible with the structure and needs of modern society, 
the wall has to have a few doors in it”). 
 10. KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 13. 
 11. See id. at 130, 162-77. 
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is the “right one,” or the one that God supports.12 They object to 
the Religious Right’s professions that, unless one views an is-
sue a certain way or supports a specific candidate or political 
party, one is not Christian; they argue that, by using these im-
proper tactics, the Religious Right manipulates the public’s 
perception, drawing attention away from important issues.13 
The Godless Constitution further challenges the Religious 
Right’s assertion that this is a Christian nation, and criticizes 
its alleged “flip-flop,” or reversal. Kramnick and Moore assert 
that, having failed at its attempt to include a Christian God in 
the Constitution, the Christian Right has changed its tactics 
and “today is seeking ways to ascribe to the Constitution a reli-
gious purpose.”14 The authors point out that “Americans are 
continually told that the framers were deeply religious, God-
fearing Christians . . . . It follows that such religious men 
drafted a Christian Constitution in which God presides over 
and inspires a Christian political system.”15 This misreading of 
history, coupled with politics of exclusion, is deeply offensive to 
Kramnick and Moore, who accuse the Christian Right of ma-
nipulating history to serve their purposes. 
Kramnick and Moore’s interpretation of history (which has 
received some criticism of its own)16 describes three leaders– 
 
 12. The authors state:  
Our Constitution, which did not found a nation under God, gives religious 
people no special claims on the political process; they should not, if they re-
spect Article Six, deem a candidate’s personal religious views of any more 
relevance than whether a candidate plays golf. It perhaps also implies that 
when they speak publicly about politics, they should never claim the author-
ity of divine truth. 
Id. at 10. 
 13. See id. at 164. 
 14. Id. at 143. “ ‘The Constitution was designed to perpetuate a Christian order,’ 
the Christian Right’s Focus on the Family informs us.” Id. at 27. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Stephen B. Presser criticizes the historical deficiencies of The Godless Consti-
tution’s characterization of the founding fathers’ intent in writing the Establishment 
and “No Religious Test” Clauses in Some Realism About Atheism: Responses to The 
Godless Constitution, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 87 (1997). Presser refutes the authors’ as-
sertion that the Constitution is godless by pointing to places in the Constitution which 
recognize an underlying Christian belief. See id. at 96-100. He also controverts Kram-
nick and Moore’s claims that Americans were not particularly religious by pointing out 
that “many, if not most, of the earliest American colonial settlements were made with 
religious aims in view, and laws regarding the Sabbath, attendance at church, or re-
quired financial support for the church were nearly everywhere in force.” Id. at 93. 
When eleven out of the existent thirteen states had religious test clauses, Presser finds 
it difficult to conclude that early Americans were not particularly religious. See id. at 
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Roger Williams, James Madison, and Thomas Jefferson—who 
were deeply committed to the formation of a secular state 
where religion and government are separate. They describe a 
Constitution which specifically omitted reference to God, leav-
ing the responsibility for the teaching of morality and religion 
in the hands of churches, individuals, and families. 
What is the role of religion in public life for Kramnick and 
Moore? First, they argue vehemently that while religion is not 
excluded from the public square, “[it] can claim no special privi-
leges.”17 For the authors, government endorsement or support 
of religion in any form is per se unconstitutional. Second, 
Kramnick and Moore assert that “a person’s religious faith, or 
lack thereof, should never be an issue in partisan poli-
tics.”18 Therefore, any “religious test,” or requirement, however 
indirect, that a person possess certain religious beliefs or ad-
here to a particular religion in order to hold public office, vio-
lates the Constitution. 
The Godless Constitution serves a valuable function in 
alerting private individuals and politicians of the dangers of 
the Christian Right’s techniques, and of challenging the his-
torical claims of the Christian Coalition to a Christian Consti-
tution. Notwithstanding these strengths, its weaknesses (an 
unusable scholarly format, failure to consider the wealth of 
current scholarship on this issue, and subsequent failure to ad-
dress key issues) limit the book’s usefulness for those who seek 
 
98 (quoting KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 28). 
Presser then excoriates Kramnick’s apparently casual reading of the Federalist 
papers. Kramnick, himself an editor of an edition of the Federalist papers (New York: 
Viking Penguin, 1987), wrote that “nowhere do they discuss America as a Christian 
people with a Christian government.” KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 31. By 
pointing to numerous passages in the Federalist papers which refer to the blessings of 
Providence and prayer, Presser refutes this assertion. See Presser, 1 TEX. REV. L. & 
POL. at 100-02. Presser also undercuts the authors’ reliance on Madison for a strict 
separationist view by pointing out that the same day that Madison moved in support of 
Jefferson’s Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in the Virginia legislature, 
he also sponsored a bill for punishing Sabbath breakers. See id. at 108; cf. KRAMNICK & 
MOORE, supra note 1, at 108. Madison also proclaimed a national day of fasting and 
prayer in connection with the War of 1812. See Presser, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. at 108-
09. But see KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 103-04, which indicates that Madison 
later regretted this decision. 
For further criticism of Kramnick and Moore’s strictly godless reconstruction of 
constitutional history, see Erez Kalir, Is the Constitution “Godless” or Just Nondenomi-
national?, 106 YALE L.J. 917 (1996). 
 17. KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 168. 
 18. Id. 
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to determine their views in this debate or influence the opin-
ions of others. While the book does not pretend to be the defini-
tive work on the subject, The Godless Constitution needs to be 
more comprehensive and better documented to persuade those 
with some understanding of the legal, political, and religious 
arguments involved to accept the authors’ view of the appro-
priate relationship between religion and government. 
Part II, which follows, points out the major flaws in Kram-
nick and Moore’s case against religious correctness. Part II.A. 
discusses the authors’ advocacy of self-censorship by religious 
adherents in political discourse and argues that the authors’ 
advocacy of such restraint, though based in sound public policy, 
is itself unconstitutional. Part II.B. considers the informal reli-
gious test clause our society imposes, and the difficulty of bal-
ancing the “No Religious Test” Clause of the Constitution and 
its intent with the need to consider the character, morality, and 
ethical stance of political candidates. This section ultimately 
concludes that although it may be preferable not to consider 
the religious views of a political candidate, it is not unconstitu-
tional. Part II.C. addresses the authors’ creation of a “straw 
man” of religious correctness to bear the brunt of their gripes, 
and contends that by painting all religious people as extrem-
ists, they ignore the contributions of moderate religious believ-
ers in political discourse. 
Part III addresses critical omissions in The Godless Consti-
tution that greatly decrease the value of the work in current 
scholarship. Part III.A. addresses the scope of the Establish-
ment Clause and the states’ former right, under the Constitu-
tion, to make laws respecting religion. Part III.B. discusses 
ceremonial deism, arguing that the authors should have ad-
dressed this issue and found that most forms of ceremonial de-
ism are unconstitutional. 
Part IV of this Note concludes that the people of the United 
States have great latitude in determining how they wish to ex-
ercise their freedom of speech and freedom to choose their po-
litical leaders. The Establishment Clause, which restrains the 
federal government from making laws respecting or endorsing 
religion in any way, does not have a counterpart which re-
strains the United States citizenry from viewing the world 
through a religious lens or incorporating religion in public life. 
Therefore, the authors’ case against religious correctness has a 
weak legal basis. 
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II.  THE CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 
A.  Authors’ Implicit Advocacy of Self-Censorship by Religious 
Leaders and Adherents in Public Discourse 
Kramnick and Moore convey conflicting messages about 
what participation they believe religious individuals and lead-
ers should have in politics. They repeatedly emphasize that re-
ligious leaders should receive no special treat-
ment.19 Recognizing that “American society especially invites a 
religious perspective in public debate,” they contend “that if 
you want respect for your ideas, you have to earn it.”20 To their 
credit, the authors recognize that “[t]here are very few religious 
actions in politics that are unconstitutional. There are simply 
religious actions in politics that are wise and unwise, generous 
and ungenerous, informed and uninformed.”21 
Despite these assertions, throughout The Godless Constitu-
tion, Kramnick and Moore describe what they believe to be le-
gitimate and illegitimate religious involvement in politics.22 
 
 19. See id. at 20; see also id. at 169 (“Religious leaders can demand no more than 
the same treatment accorded to business leaders, hot dog vendors, and jubilant propo-
nents of a ‘Queer America.’ ”). 
 20. Id. “Wearing a clerical garment to a political meeting is perfectly legal, but it 
doesn’t guarantee you respect or give you the right to go to the head of a long line of 
speakers.” Id. at 169. 
 21. Id. 
 22. The authors differentiate between a 
Southern Baptist who is inclined to be conservative on many social issues . . . 
and a convention of Southern Baptists who have been lobbied by Baptist 
leaders to vote for conservative candidates because that is what Christians 
who read their Bible ought to do. Politics in a secular state means that there 
is no Christian position on whether tax cuts are a good or a bad idea, on 
whether the terms of congressmen ought to be limited, and whether the capi-
tal gains tax ought to be lowered. There are ways in which Christians are in-
fluenced by their religion when they take stands on the question of abortion 
rights, of whether feeding the poor and homeless ought to be a government 
responsibility, and of whether the United States ought to support the state of 
Israel. But that influence leads to different conclusions. None of these conclu-
sions represents the voice of God, not in political debate. 
Id. at 127-28; see also id. at 9. 
The Christian Coalition website catalogues different political candidates’ views 
on issues and compares them with its official position (which presumably, for the 
Christian Coalition, represents God’s position). Candidates are then ranked and Coali-
tion members are encouraged to vote for candidates whose views are most consistent 
with the Christian Coalition’s position. The potential result of citizens voting based on 
the Christian Coalition’s rankings, rather than on their own views, is a danger that 
Kramnick and Moore likely would consider an illegitimate injection of religion into 
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The recurring theme is that the expression of religious views in 
political debate by religious leaders and adherents should be 
limited. In their view, politicians should not discuss their views 
of God, clergy should not vocally support specific candidates, 
and voters should never choose a particular candidate based on 
his or her religious beliefs.23 For the authors, there is a line be-
yond which injection of religious sentiment violates the man-
dates of the Establishment Clause. The authors feel that the 
difficulty is “in specifying criteria that tell us when the reli-
gious biases of voters become an illegitimate injection of God 
into politics.”24 
It is arguable that in a secular state, competing interests 
will duke it out and the result will be some kind of middle 
ground. Instead of looking to “robust debate”25 for a solution, 
however, Kramnick and Moore advocate a self-censored society, 
wherein religiously influenced people limit their speech in pub-
lic forums to conform with the restrictions that apply to the 
federal government under the Establishment Clause. 
The real problem with Kramnick and Moore’s position is 
that the Constitution does not warn against an “illegitimate in-
jection of God into politics.”26 Rather, the Constitution prohibits 
 
politics. See U.S. Senate 1998 Election Scorecard, (visited Mar. 11, 1999) 
<http://www.cc.org/ scorecards/98ES/s98elec.html>. 
 23. The authors state: 
It is not legitimate for political leaders to mobilize religion in order to invest 
their argument about moral consequences with certainty, to imagine that 
their undertaking of God’s will should be shared by everyone. . . . [P]oliticians 
who run for office claiming God’s backing and who urge voters to make their 
decisions on the basis of a candidate’s religious beliefs are treading on ground 
that the Constitution did not want entered. 
KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 175-76. The authors’ description of “Senator Phil 
Gramm’s shameless advances to the Christian Right” is illustrative of the type of reli-
gious-political speech they condemn. Id. at 172. Apparently,  
[i]n campaign speeches and mass-mailed letters, Gramm paraded a belief in 
Christ’s Second Coming to win votes. Quite aside from the issue of the sincer-
ity of his beliefs, which in the political arena is always suspect, Gramm os-
tentatiously violated the Jeffersonian view that politicians, in deference to 
the ‘no religious test’ clause, should keep their religious opinions to them-
selves. 
Id. 
 24. Id. at 61. 
 25. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 361 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 26. KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 61. The only illegitimate injections of 
religion into politics under the United States Constitution would be through the crea-
tion of a religious test act or a national religion by the government. As both of these 
things are clearly prohibited by the Constitution, the authors’ concern is unwarranted. 
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the illegitimate injection of politics into religion. Therefore, re-
gardless of how sympathetic one may be to the argument that 
the religious biases of voters and politicians should be tem-
pered to consider the diverse citizenry this country boasts, 
nothing may be done to prevent people from fully using their 
First Amendment free speech rights to express their religious-
based views on political issues.27 
Although the framers may have hoped for, and believed in, 
the separation Kramnick and Moore advocate, as George Wash-
ington put it, there is an “absence of any regulation respecting 
religion from the Magna Carta of our country.”28 This appears 
to prohibit any interference with how churches seek to use 
their influence. As long as Congress is not legislating con-
science or endorsing or promoting any religion, nothing can be 
done about common citizens who choose not to separate church 
and state in their own political participation.29 While the Es-
tablishment Clause prohibits “ ‘government endorsement of a 
religious viewpoint, . . . .’ when providing conduits for private 
speech, government must eschew censorship and must fully re-
spect the First Amendment speech rights of such private par-
ties.”30 Michael A. Berg outlines the free speech problems trig-
gered by contending that religious speech violates the 
Establishment Clause: 
 
 27. One commentator has noted that  
[t]he insistence of religious conservatives on having their values reflected in 
public policy thus poses a provocative question: What is the proper role of re-
ligion in American political discourse? Citizens’ expressions of religious sen-
timent are clearly protected by both the religion and speech provisions of the 
First Amendment. Courts cannot restrain religiously motivated citizens in 
the exercise of those rights. Moreover, in light of the historic importance of 
religion as a spur to social reform, any attempt to suppress religious voices as 
such would be folly. 
Berg, supra note 3, at 38. 
 28. KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 102. 
 29. The authors acknowledge that their suggestions cannot be implemented, 
thereby reducing any possible practical application of their views. “We would be foolish 
to suggest that there is a fully consistent way to implement the position we defend, and 
any position with respect to the question of religion and politics in the United States 
should remain supple and negotiable.” KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 168. The 
authors characterize their ideas as a “set of suggestions, which people in this free coun-
try are free to ignore but which we think work to the advantage of both politics and re-
ligion.” Id. at 176. 
 30. Thomas Morawetz, On Conduits and Voices, 28 CONN. L. REV. 261, 261 
(1996) (quoting Kathleen Sullivan, Parades, Public Squares and Voucher Payments: 
Problems of Government Neutrality, 28 CONN. L. REV. 243, 251 (1996)). 
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Citizens’ expressions of religious sentiment are clearly 
protected by both the religion and speech provisions of 
the First Amendment. . . . It does not follow, however, 
that political decision-making or argument based on re-
ligious tenets is appropriate or wise. . . . [M]uch of the 
current activism on the part of religious conservatives 
offends constitutional values.31 
Religion-based political argument may indeed be “problem-
atic” and “an inapt form of public dialogue” for a number of 
reasons.32 There is great value to creating a political environ-
ment where all citizens feel able to participate equally. To cre-
ate this environment, it may be necessary to avoid speech 
which is inaccessible to some participants.33 Berg suggests, “It 
is fair to ask participants in politics to restrain their religious 
impulses in public political speech,” even though “asking them 
to do so in their private decision-making [would be] impractical 
and intrusive.”34 In order to accommodate “a diverse society 
[which] requires a lingua franca by which people with various 
sources of values may translate their collective will into public 
policy,”35 Professor Kathleen M. Sullivan insists that “moral 
disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular 
terms.”36  
Valid public policy reasons thus support Kramnick and 
Moore’s suggestion that religious people censor their political 
speech, although this arguably would violate principles of free 
speech.37 However, their suggestion demonstrates a disturbing 
 
 31. Berg, supra note 3, at 38-39. 
 32. Id. at 57. 
 33. See generally, KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 174-76. 
 34. Berg, supra note 3, at 57. 
 35. Id. at 56. 
 36. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 
195, 197 (1992); see also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 37. As Berg emphasizes,  
publicly accessible reasons for government policies are preferable to sectarian 
justifications because minority religionists cannot fully participate in a dia-
logue rooted in faith; since no single religious faith can provide a shared lan-
guage for decision-making, “[t]he common currency of political discourse 
[must be] nonreligious arguments about human welfare. Public discourse 
about political issues with those who do not share [the same] religious prem-
ises should be cast in other than religious terms.” 
Berg, supra note 3, at 56. 
The accessibility arguments posed by Berg and Sullivan are undermined by the 
fact that they do not seek to impose limits on equally inaccessible secular-based argu-
ments. Many psychological and scientific theories, like religious theories, are widely 
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lack of confidence in political leaders, clergy, and laymen. This 
theory postulates that politicians will be unable to identify ar-
guments that are not substantiated by corresponding secular 
rationale and, therefore, may not be used as the basis for law. 
Further, this theory fears that religious leaders will not modify 
their speech to reach and respect the diverse political audience 
existing today and questions the ability of religious adherents 
to think for themselves, as opposed to blindly following their 
leaders.38 
It is true that there are many who do not understand the 
importance of government equidistance39 and who seek to en-
shrine their religious beliefs in the law at the expense of people 
with different beliefs. Nevertheless, in a society where “robust 
 
debated and unverifiable by conclusive evidence. Therefore, even among psychologists 
and scientists, such theories may not provide a “common currency” for debate. Id. 
These theories are even less accessible to others who may not understand them and do 
not have the resources or knowledge to test their reliability. Nevertheless, such debat-
able, speculative, and unconfirmed theories are offered every day without opposition, 
presumably because there is no moral element to them. A good argument exists that 
because so many forms of speech are inaccessible, the solution should be for the propo-
nents of psychological or scientific theories or religious beliefs to make the arguments 
accessible by explaining the context in which they exist. It appears that Kramnick, 
Moore, Berg, or Sullivan’s goal in suggesting that religious adherents limit their speech 
to secular rationale is to achieve comprehension and a level playing field where all 
people (religious or not) feel free to participate. Because truly common ground is hard 
to find, perhaps the solution is not to eliminate discussion of things that are not be-
lieved by all (thus eliminating debate itself), but to encourage the explanation of one’s 
views in their context. 
Particularly in light of section II.B. infra, it appears that much of the American 
public considers a candidate’s religion, or lack thereof, when voting. It follows that the 
public wishes the politician to express his or her religious viewpoint and to use that 
position to influence the outcome of political decisions. 
 38. This is particularly interesting in light of Jefferson’s statement about his 
Statute for Religious Freedom, quoted by Kramnick and Moore: “[I]t is honorable for us 
to have produced the first legislature who had the courage to declare that the reason of 
man may be trusted with the formation of his own opinions.” KRAMNICK & MOORE, su-
pra note 1, at 93. 
 39. See Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of 
the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357 (1996), for a discussion of “equi-
distance” as the appropriate relationship between church and state. Lupu argues that 
the requirement of government equidistance may be satisfied in most situations 
through government neutrality towards religion. Id. at 357, 362-63. Kramnick and 
Moore claim that the Religious Right does not understand principles of “government 
neutrality.” KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 174. However, what they advocate, 
and what the Supreme Court requires, is not neutrality. It is complete separationism. 
Principles of neutrality would allow the government to aid religion as long as it treated 
all religions alike. Separationism, on the other hand, prohibits the government from 
aiding, endorsing, or furthering religion in any way. Perhaps Kramnick and Moore 
would do well to read Lupu. 
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debate”40 is encouraged and protected by the First Amendment 
to weed out error through the clash of conflicting viewpoints, 
the way to combat ignorance is through education, not censor-
ship. A population who understands the purpose and benefits 
of erecting a wall of separation between church and state is less 
likely to accept religious propaganda from political candidates. 
Instead, it will focus on the candidate’s platform and ability to 
carry out campaign promises. 
Kramnick and Moore accuse the Religious Right of aban-
doning the founders’ faith in religious laissez-faire;41 however, 
the authors can be accused of doing just that. Religious laissez-
faire means allowing religious people to bring religion into pub-
lic life as they desire. It means permitting voters to consider a 
political candidate’s religion and allowing people to support 
whichever candidate or party they choose to support, based on 
whatever secular or religious reasons they see fit. Therefore, 
while public debate centered in secular and moral argument is 
preferable to religious-based discussion, the Constitution in no 
way mandates this result. Further, as Stephen Carter argues, 
“In a nation that prides itself on cherishing religious freedom, 
it would be something of a puzzle to conclude that the Estab-
lishment Clause means that a Communist or a Republican may 
try to have his or her world view reflected in the nation’s law, 
but a religionist can not.”42 A system restraining the speech of 
religious adherents in public debate would allow the liberal left 
to rage unchecked, while the Religious Right would be forced to 
hold its tongue. 
B.  America’s Informal Religious Test Clause 
Kramnick and Moore correctly argue that, despite a per-
fectly good “No Religious Test” Clause, the American public 
and the Christian Right impose their own religious test by 
making the religious or irreligious beliefs of a political candi-
date an issue.43 Although there are far more atheists or non-
theists now than there were in Colonial America, the number 
of openly atheist political candidates has not increased propor-
 
 40. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 361 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 41. See KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 85. 
 42. CARTER, supra note 9, at 113. 
 43. KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 60-61, 168. 
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tionately.44 The authors reason, “To declare oneself a nontheist 
is de facto to disqualify oneself for the office of president of the 
United States. One’s religion is more of an issue in this country 
of religious disestablishment than in most countries where re-
ligious establishment still exists.”45 
The authors note that the Rhode Island renegade, Roger 
Williams, wanted no religious test for politicians, believing that 
“[t]he political skills necessary to preserve civil peace might as 
easily be found among Jews, or Turks, or Chinese as among 
people who professed Christianity.”46 The characteristics of a 
good ruler were not synonymous with the characteristics of a 
good Christian.47 
Still, politicians continue to raise their religious beliefs in 
political discourse, hoping that it will cause the public to have 
more confidence and trust in them.48 In addition to violating 
the intent of the Establishment and “No Religious Test” 
Clauses, the authors claim that such “shameless pandering by 
politicians” of their professed religious affiliations and beliefs 
to win votes “is quite literally an exploitation of God,” which 
tends to cheapen religion.49 They argue that such pandering 
undermines the credibility of all who profess to believe in God. 
Further, they contend that it causes the general public to criti-
cize and doubt those who encourage citizens and politicians to 
consider religion-based moral and ethical beliefs in making po-
litical and legal decisions.50 
 
 44. See id. at 55-56, 168. 
 45. Id. at 56. Unlike countries such as France, which has elected both Jews and 
atheists “without a great deal of fuss. . . . [t]his country, which abandoned an estab-
lished church first, has kept an informal test for its highest office the longest.” Id. at 
168. No thanks to the Christian Right, the authors imply. 
 46. Id. at 54. 
 47. See id. at 55. 
 48. For examples of expression of religious belief by politicians, see the speeches 
of Rep. Dick Armey, Sen. John Ashcroft, Rep. Tom DeLay, Rep. Newt Gingrich, Rep. 
John Kasich, Sen. Trent Lott, Sen. Mitch McConnell, Hon. Dan Quayle, Sen. Bob 
Smith, and Rep. J.C. Watts at the Christian Coalition, Road to Victory 1998 Confer-
ence. Transcripts and audio files of their speeches can be found at 
<http://www.cc.org/rtv98/speeches/speeches/html> (visited Mar. 11, 1999). 
 49. KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 56. 
 50. First, it is hard to believe that it is not government endorsement of religion 
when President Clinton extols “our duty to pass on to our children the Earth God gave 
us,” emphasizes the need to “live up to [our] God-given potential,” and thanks his pas-
tor “for bringing [him] closer to God.” President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks to 
Family, Friends, the People of Arkansas, and the People of the United States (visited 
Mar. 9, 1999) <http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/ur-ires/I2R?urn.pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/ 
DAL-FIN.DOC 4/10/00  1:11 PM 
861] BOOK REVIEW: THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION 873 
What then are the limits of the “No Religious Test” Clause? 
Does the Constitution prevent citizens from considering the re-
ligion of political candidates? Kramnick and Moore argue that 
voters should not “deem a candidate’s personal religious views 
of any more relevance than whether a candidate plays 
golf.”51 While the spirit of this clause may dictate such an out-
come, it is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve because the 
morality or integrity of a candidate is always perceived to be at 
issue. Because it is difficult to separate a candidate’s religion 
from his or her ethics, the public generally wants to know 
about a candidate’s religious affiliations.52 Just as there are “re-
ligious actions in politics . . . that are wise and unwise,”53 there 
are wise and unwise considerations in choosing a political can-
didate. While it is arguably preferable for voters to consider 
platforms and competency and for candidates to focus on issues 
and plans, it is not unconstitutional for either group it make re-
ligious beliefs an issue.54 Further, there is no mechanism in law 
 
1996/11/6/2.ext.1>. In 35 of the 49 speeches posted on the website which President 
Clinton delivered from 1993-1998, Clinton closes his address with a “God bless” of some 
sort. In eight of the fourteen speeches in which he does not close with “God bless,” there 
are references to God in the speech, either explicitly or through references to the Bible. 
That leaves only 6 of 49 speeches in which there is absolutely no reference to God. 
Three of those six addresses were given in foreign countries. Therefore, the President of 
the United States has recognized a Judeo-Christian God in 94% of his recent speeches 
to the American people. To locate copies of President Clinton’s speeches, see 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OP/html/OP_ Speeches.html>. Incidentally, Ste-
ven B. Epstein includes “presidential addresses invoking the name of God” in his list of 
“core” ceremonial deism practices. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. 
Second, in light of recent scandals, such professions of faith cause the public to 
question the sincerity of every person who professes a religious belief, thus filling the 
public with a skepticism that is hostile to religion. See KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 
1, at 56. The argument of The Godless Constitution, in part, turns upon “the fears of 
the founders, thoroughly justified by recent events, that politically partisan uses of re-
ligion would turn politics into pandering and undermine the vital moral authority of 
America’s churches.” Id. at 8. 
 51. Id. at 10. 
 52. Further, candidates generally wish their religion to be known to appeal to an 
audience that shares their beliefs. Hence, it is unlikely that America’s informal test 
clause will ever disappear. The only hope is that, as America’s political climate be-
comes more diverse, a candidate’s professed religion will become less of an issue. 
 53. Id. at 169. 
 54. Taking a political candidate’s religious views to task is certainly nothing new. 
A banner printed by the Gazette of the United States in the spring of 1800 read, “THE 
GRAND QUESTION STATED. At the present solemn moment the only question to be 
asked by every American, laying his hand on his heart, is ‘shall I continue in allegiance 
to GOD—AND A RELIGIOUS PRESIDENT; or impiously declare for JEFFERSON—
AND NO GOD!!!’ ” Id. at 91. 
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or politics to implement the changes Kramnick and Moore ad-
vocate. Because it is perfectly permissible to consider a candi-
date’s religion, along with his or her favorite food and shoe size, 
Kramnick and Moore’s complaints against religious voters and 
candidates amount to nothing more than a pedantic temper 
tantrum.55 
C.  The “Straw Man” of Religious Correctness 
A critical flaw in Kramnick and Moore’s case against reli-
gious correctness is the “party of religious correctness” that it 
creates.56 Throughout the book the authors rail against the 
Christian Coalition generally, and against Pat Buchanan, 
Ralph Reed, and Pat Robertson specifically. Apart from iso-
lated references to Senator Phil Gramm57 and Newt Gingrich,58 
these are the only three persons whom Kramnick and Moore 
associate with the Religious Right. While the Christian Coali-
tion is growing in its political influence, it is not the vigilante, 
right wing extremist group that Kramnick and Moore make it 
out to be. As one critic put it, “[W]hen [Kramnick and Moore] 
turn to arguing against today’s religious right, they have to 
concede that actual Christian political spokespersons aren’t 
jackbooted theocrats.”59 
Nevertheless, instead of objectively considering the contri-
butions of the moderate right, Kramnick and Moore “set up a 
straw man called ‘religious correctness’ to take the hits they 
want to score.”60 The authors do not cite to any specific state-
 
 55. Cf. Scott C. Idleman, Liberty in the Balance: Religion, Politics, and American 
Constitutionalism, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991, 1013-14 (1996) (“This does not mean, 
of course, that the Religious Right has committed no transgressions. To be sure, its 
brand of political participation may often be deemed impolite and even imprudent; at 
some points, intolerant and exclusionary. As such, it may very well violate free-
standing principles of liberal democracy, defy principles of political prudence, threaten 
social cohesion, and offend the theology of the participants. But standing alone these 
are not cognizable sins against the Constitution, godless or otherwise. Indeed, there 
may even be a certain silliness and arrogance in articulating the view that God sub-
scribes to one’s political ticket, but—lest the business of government itself come to a 
halt—silliness and arrogance are not, and have never been, constitutional offenses.”). 
  56. KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 13. 
 57. See id. at 172. 
 58. See id. at 27, 31, 165-66. 
 59. Ray Olson, Reviews from Booklist, Dec. 15, 1995 (visited Mar. 23, 1999) 
<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ts/book-reviews/039331524X/ref=sim_books/002-
4908386-7170860>. 
 60. Id. 
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ments or activities of these religiously-affiliated political 
groups, but refer only to generalities and tendencies. A peek 
into the activities of these groups shows that they are much 
less extreme and vocal than Kramnick and Moore allege. Even 
assuming for the purposes of argument that the radical Chris-
tian Right is as extreme as The Godless Constitution claims, 
the authors fail to consider the valuable contributions of main-
stream religious people to political dialogue. The authors com-
pletely overlook positions “held by moderate, rational, religious 
citizens who believe that American politics should be neither 
hermetically secular nor fanatically theocratic.”61 The tails they 
pin on their scapegoat donkey of religious correctness cannot 
and should not be applied to mainstream religious people and, 
consequently, miss the mark. 
III.  CRITICAL OMISSIONS 
The tragic flaw of The Godless Constitution is that Kram-
nick and Moore have written in a political science and histori-
cal vacuum. There is a notable absence of law in the authors’ 
analysis. Considering that every issue they discuss is either 
explicitly legal or is linked to an aspect of the law, the authors 
should have considered in greater detail the current state of 
the law and existing scholarship related to the issues in-
volved.62 As a result of their failure to do so, the authors disre-
gard a number of critical issues inextricably linked to a discus-
sion of the role of religion in the creation of federal and state 
policy and law. Two of these issues are addressed briefly be-
low.63 
 
 61. Erez Kalir, Is the Constitution “Godless” or Just Nondenominational?, 106 
YALE L.J. 917, 922 (1996). 
 62. If the authors did engage in such research, they would have done well to 
document the works consulted. In “A Note on Sources” the authors comment, “Because 
we have intended the book to reach a general audience, and also because the material 
we have cited is for the most part familiar to historians and political scientists, we have 
dispensed with the usual scholarly apparatus of footnotes.” KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra 
note 1, at 179. The problem with this statement is that the “general audience” is not 
made up of historians and political scientists. In their attempt to make the book user-
friendly, Kramnick and Moore have alienated readers who do not have independent 
knowledge of the historical and political movements they refer to and who wish to test 
the accuracy of their conclusions. Endnotes would hardly have been intrusive in the 
text and, though time consuming for the authors, would have increased the level of ac-
countability for the authors’ claims and, consequently, the intrinsic value of the work. 
 63. Numerous other issues have been raised by fellow critics of The Godless Con-
stitution. See, e.g., Kalir, supra note 61. Kalir points out that current court decisions do 
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A.  The Scope of the Establishment Clause64 
The Godless Constitution fails to address the issue of why 
the Establishment Clause applies to the States under current 
law and whether this law is congruent with the intent of the 
framers and the First Congress.65 The authors concede that 
 
not attempt to decide whether this is a Christian nation or godless nation, as do Kram-
nick and Moore, but rather attempt to decide “what constitutes religious freedom and 
what religious coercion.” Id. at 922. 
Another issue the authors neglect is raised by Alexandra D. Furth who seeks to 
understand what is this religion we should separate from state. In Secular Idolatry and 
Sacred Traditions: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Secularization Analysis, 146 U. 
PA. L. REV. 579 (1998), Furth points out the contradictory decisions of courts which in-
dicate that there may be a need for a better understanding of this religion that we are 
to keep separated from the state. Courts have found crèche displays in public buildings 
around Christmas to be constitutional and unconstitutional, depending on the setting. 
Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) with County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 
492 U.S. 573 (1989). Mary Harter Mitchell attempts to define both “religion” and the 
meaning of “establishment” in Secularism in Public Education: The Constitutional Is-
sues, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 603, 690-91 (1987). 
Can laws originally based on religious beliefs be defended on secular grounds af-
ter the fact? Currently the law requires that every law be based in, or at least sup-
ported by, secular principles. See generally Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 
(1947). This means that a law may not stand which is based only on a claim that God 
disapproves of the regulated behavior. Cf. School Dist. of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (“[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment 
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion.”). Some scholars argue that laws whose legislative his-
tory reflect any consideration at all of religious principles are per se unconstitutional. 
See Michael J. Perry, Religion, Politics, and the Constitution, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 407 (1996). Others argue that the intent behind a law should not be inquired 
into unless “the inquiry is clearly necessary to serve the greater good of preserving re-
ligious liberty for all.” Berg, supra note 3, at 41. 
This conflict is important to the issues Kramnick and Moore address, and is par-
ticularly applicable to their discussion of the Sunday mail debate. The authors discuss 
how initially the decision to move and distribute mail on Sundays was a great victory 
for separationists because the secular needs of the state to have speedy access to news 
and information overrode the Christian value of resting on the Sabbath day. See 
KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 132-34. Kramnick and Moore brush under the 
rug the reversal of this holding in the 1950’s, by commenting only that the decision to 
close post offices on Sunday violated the principles behind the Constitution. See id. at 
142-43. The authors neglect to discuss, however, whether the law not to deliver mail on 
Sunday can be defended on a secular basis or whether the decision to have no Sunday 
mail constitutes government endorsement or promotion of Christianity, contrary to the 
Establishment Clause. Consequently, it is unclear whether Kramnick and Moore would 
go back to the origin of the law and, because of its religious underpinnings, invalidate 
the law, or whether they would uphold this and other religion-based laws provided 
there is sufficient secular basis. 
 64. See generally Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establish-
ment Clause, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1113, 1117 (1988). 
 65. For a more detailed discussion of these issues see Steven D. Smith, 
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“[t]he religious clauses of the First Amendment to the Consti-
tution placed no constraints on individual states.”66 However, 
in their discussion of the separation of church and state, they 
make no attempt to distinguish between the rights reserved for 
state governments under the Constitution and the limits placed 
on the federal government. The government or “state” is de-
scribed as being powerless to act in any way relating to relig-
ion, and the authors’ only discussion of permissible state in-
volvement in religion is viewed through the eyes of Roger 
Williams.67 
The authors act as though the scope of the Establishment 
Clause is totally unambiguous. There is considerable evidence 
that the framers and the early American presidents understood 
that the clause prohibited the federal government from creat-
ing a national religion, and empowered the state governments 
to make, or refrain from making, whatever laws regarding re-
ligion they saw fit. Although the Supreme Court has held that 
the Establishment Clause does apply to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment,68 there is considerable evidence indi-
cating that the founders were not opposed to government en-
dorsement of religion, as long as it was instigated by state gov-
ernments. 
Joseph Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, 
wrote that “ ‘the whole power over the subject of religion is left 
exclusively to the state governments.’ ”69 In the First Congress 
of 1789, the same day the Bill of Rights was passed, a bill rec-
ommending “a day of public thanksgiving and prayer” was in-
troduced.70 A representative opposed the bill, stating: “[I]t is a 
religious matter, and as such, is not proscribed to us. If a day of 
thanksgiving must take place, let it be done by the authority of 
the several States.”71 Although President Adams proclaimed 
fast days while in office, he later said, “Nothing is more 
 
FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 17-30 (1995). 
 66. KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 118. 
 67. See id. at 58. 
 68. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 69. Akhil Reed Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER 
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1873 (1833)). 
 70. Id. at 5 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 949-50 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (1st ed. 
pagination)). 
 71. Id. 
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dreaded . . . than the national government meddling with relig-
ion.”72 Adams was not concerned with state involvement in re-
ligion, because he considered such matters completely within 
state jurisdiction.73 
The organization of the early states is further evidence of 
the intent for states to have power over religion. “In 1789, at 
least six states had government-supported churches.”74 Eleven 
out of the thirteen states had religious test clauses, restricting 
participation in government to those of particular faiths, to the 
exclusion of others.75 As professor Akhil Reed Amar explains it, 
“a single national religious regime would have been horribly 
oppressive to many men and women of faith; local control, by 
contrast, would allow dissenters in any place to vote with their 
feet and find a community with the right religious tone.”76 
Despite this evidence of intent, the Supreme Court later be-
gan to interpret the Establishment Clause as a prohibition on 
both federal and state government involvement in religion. In 
Justice Black’s decision to ban the practice of school prayer in 
New York, he stated: 
There can, of course, be no doubt that New York’s pro-
gram of daily classroom invocation of God’s blessings as 
prescribed in the Regents’ prayer is a religious activity. 
It is a solemn avowal of divine faith and supplication for 
the blessings of the Almighty. . . . 
 . . . [W]e think that the Constitutional prohibition 
against laws respecting an establishment of religion 
must at least mean that in this country it is no part of 
the business of government to compose official prayers 
for any group of the American people to recite as a part 
 
 72. KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 102 (emphasis added). 
 73. See also Amar, supra note 69, at 4-5 (“Thus, while President Jefferson in 1802 
refused to proclaim a day of religious Thanksgiving, he had done just that as Governor 
Jefferson some 20 years before.”). 
 74. Id. at 2; see also 1 AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
PEOPLE 460-61 (1975) cited in ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 
1986). Massachussetts was the last state to disengage religion “as an engine of the 
state” and “end its establishement of religion” in 1833. Leonard W. Levy, THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 42 (2d ed. 1994). 
 75. See THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA 
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 221 (1986). Presser uses this fact to refute 
the authors’ assertion that early Americans were not particularly religious people. See 
Presser, supra note 16, at 98; KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 28. 
 76. Amar, supra note 69, at 14. 
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of a religious program carried on by government.77 
Courts have interpreted this decision to mean that the Con-
stitution, provides “that both state and federal governments 
shall take no part respecting the establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”78 
Kramnick and Moore do not consider what happened be-
tween 1787 and 1962 to expand the purview of the Establish-
ment Clause to include state governments. Although they ad-
mit on the one hand that the Establishment Clause did not 
bind the states when enacted,79 all of their discussion regarding 
the separation of religion and government implies that this 
separation applies to all levels of government. Presumably, 
they agree with the Supreme Court rulings that expand the 
purview of the Establishment Clause to apply to the states but 
there is no discussion of the changes that took place in this 
area or the inconsistencies between the current state of the law 
and the founders’ intent. 
Numerous scholars disagree with the Supreme Court’s 
analysis that the Establishment Clause prohibits state in-
volvement in religion. As Amar noted, 
[t]he key point is not simply that, as with the rest of the 
First Amendment, the Establishment Clause limits only 
Congress and not the states. That point is obvious on 
the face of the Amendment and is confirmed by its legis-
lative history. (It also, of course, has the imprimatur of 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Barron v. Balti-
more).80 
 
 77. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962); see also Roger K. Newman, 
School Prayer and the Ten Commandments in Alabama, Inaugural Speech in the 
Shelby E. Southard Lecture Series at Birmingham Southern College (Feb. 6, 1997), in 
28 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1997-1998) (commenting on the writing of, and repercussions 
which arose out of, Justice Black’s decision in Engel). But see Tanford v. Brand, 104 
F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding the constitutionality of school-led prayer at a uni-
versity commencement ceremony). 
 78. Newman, supra note 77, at 4 (quoting Justice Thomas Clark); cf. School Dist. 
of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221-26 (1963). 
 79. See KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 118 (“The religious clauses of the 
First Amendment to the Constitution placed no constraints on individual states.”). 
 80. Amar, supra note 69, at 3 (citation omitted). In Barron, Chief Justice Mar-
shall described the impetus behind the amendments to the Constitution as a fear that 
the federal government would overstep its bounds. He wrote, “In compliance with a 
sentiment thus generally expressed, to quiet fears thus extensively entertained, 
amendments were proposed by the required majority in congress, and adopted by the 
states. These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them 
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Amar claims that the “original establishment clause . . . is not 
anti-establishment, but pro-states’ rights.”81 Accordingly, it is 
completely ambivalent on the issue of whether laws should be 
established regarding religion and “simply calls for the issue to 
be decided locally.”82 
The Establishment Clause allows states to retain the power 
to choose whether to establish a religion.83 To apply this clause 
against the states to prevent them from becoming involved in 
religion is to use the clause to attempt to eliminate “a right ex-
plicitly confirmed by the Establishment Clause itself!”84 
Kramnick and Moore acknowledge that the Establishment 
Clause limits the federal government’s involvement in relig-
ion.85 However, they do not address how the Establishment 
Clause came to be applied to the states and the effects of that 
application on the states. They refer to constitutional intent 
and imply that the founders’ aim was to completely separate 
religion from every level of government. The evidence, however, 
suggests that this was not the case. The authors would have 
done well to discuss this discrepancy. 
B. The Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism: Is it 
Constitutional to Pledge Allegiance to this Nation “Under God”? 
Steve Epstein describes ceremonial deism as any practice 
that involves:  
1) actual symbolic, or ritualistic; 2) prayer, . . . reverent refer-
ence to, or embrace of, a general or particular deity; 3) cre-
ated, delivered, sponsored, or encouraged by government offi-
cials; 4) during governmental functions or ceremonies, in the 
form of patriotic expressions, or associated with holiday ob-
servances; 5) which, in and of themselves, are unlikely to in-
doctrinate or proselytize their audience; 6) which are not spe-
cifically designed to accommodate the free religious exercise 
of a particular group of citizens; and 7) which . . . are deeply 
rooted in the nation’s history and traditions.86 
 
to the state governments. This court cannot so apply them.” Barron v. Mayor and City 
Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833). 
 81. Amar, supra note 69, at 3. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 118. 
 86. Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 
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Examples of ceremonial deism include phrases such as “God 
save the United States and this Honorable Court”; national 
holidays celebrating Thanksgiving and Christmas; the use of 
the Bible to administer the oaths of court witnesses and jurors; 
and prayers at presidential inaugurations.87 Arguably, the con-
tinual recognition of God in so many forms amounts to blatant 
government sponsorship of both religion over irreligion and 
particular religions to the exclusion of others. Yet for centuries 
we have winked at every reference to God in these contexts, 
and have not seriously considered whether they violate the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment.88 
Alexandra D. Furth points out that the potential reason for 
continuing to ignore the conspicuous state endorsement of re-
ligion as opposed to irreligion, and a Christian God as opposed 
 
COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2095 (1996). In his book, Epstein describes a fictional United 
States society in the year 2096 where 75% of the population is Muslim. The nation’s 
motto, inscribed on the national currency, is “In Allah We Trust.” Id. at 2084. The stu-
dents dutifully repeat the Pledge of Allegiance daily in public schools, stating that 
America is one nation “under Allah.” Id. When required to give testimony in a court, 
citizens must take an oath by placing one hand on the Koran and swearing to tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, “so help me Allah.” Id. at 2085. Put 
this way, it is incredible how much of public life includes government endorsements of 
a God, which, though perhaps not exclusively a Christian god, is generally not per-
ceived to be Allah.  
While the evidence points to a group of Christian founders, there is also evidence 
that the founders did consider other religions. When Jefferson’s Statute for Religious 
Freedom was being passed in 1786, there were suggestions to add the words “Jesus 
Christ” to the passage which states, “Almighty God hath created the mind free.”  Ever-
son v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 29 (1947) (quoting A Bill for Establishing Religious 
Freedom, enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia, Jan. 19, 1786, reprinted in 1 
RANDAL, THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 219-20 (1858); XII HENING’S STATUTES OF 
VIRGINIA 84 (1823)). Commenting on this in his autobiography, Jefferson wrote, “The 
insertion . . . was rejected by a great majority, in proof that they meant to comprehend 
within the mantle of its protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and the Mo-
hometan, the Hindoo, and the infidel of every denomination.” KRAMNICK & MOORE, su-
pra note 1, at 93. 
In 1787, William Van Murray, Esq., wrote an essay in the American Museum 
wherein he stated that America  
“will be the great philosophical theater of the world,” since its Constitution 
recognizes that “Christians are not the only people there.”. . . Governments 
are created, he held, according to the “laws of nature. These are unac-
quainted with the distinctions of religious opinion; and of the terms Chris-
tian, Mohamentan, Jew or Gentile.” 
Id. at 40-41. 
 87. See Epstein, supra note 86, at 2095. 
 88. See id. at 2086-87. After analyzing ceremonial deism, past and present, Ep-
stein concludes that “the Supreme Court can and should hold most forms of ceremonial 
deism to be unconstitutional.” Id. at 2091. 
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to Allah or Buddha, for example, stems from a fear that Amer-
ica’s eroding identity will collapse with the elimination of so 
many traditional parts of public life that have been present 
since the birth of this nation.89 
When faced with these arguments, others contend that if 
Christian references were good enough for the founders who 
created the clauses, they are good enough for us.90 After all, if 
the founders intended such exclamations to be prohibited by 
the Establishment Clause, they never would have used them.91  
This argument alone, however, is insufficient to withstand 
challenge, because the cultural shape of America has changed 
radically in the last two centuries.92 Although references to God 
may not have offended any of the early framers, it is clear that 
in a multi-theistic society, such denomination-specific refer-
ences do not include all believers and unbelievers underneath 
its inadequate umbrella. 
Why, since so much of Kramnick and Moore’s argument 
hinges on impermissible intrusions of religion in politics and 
unconstitutional endorsement of religion by the government, 
did the authors not consider ceremonial deism? Although 
Kramnick and Moore amply considered the constitutionality of 
prayer in public schools,93 an issue which the Supreme Court 
has already decided,94 they fail to take the analysis one step 
 
 89. See Furth, supra note 63, at 581, 613-16. 
 90. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (“It can hardly be 
thought that in the same week Members of the First Congress voted to appoint and to 
pay a chaplain for each House and also voted to approve the draft of the First Amend-
ment for submission to the states, they intended the Establishment Clause of the 
Amendment to forbid what they had just declared acceptable.”). 
 91. See id. 
 92. See Furth, supra note 63, at 594-95 (“Establishment Clause analyses con-
structed on arguments about original intent are dubious. . . . [R]eliance on the ration-
ale and behavior of eighteenth-century lawmakers is misplaced. The meaning and pur-
pose of the Establishment Clause have changed with the social evolution of the 
nation.”). 
 93. See KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 165-66. 
 94. Because the authors chose to address only issues which the Supreme Court 
has already decided (for example, Sunday mail, Christian amendments to the Constitu-
tion, aid to parochial schools, and abortion, to name a few) and failed to tackle a con-
troversial issue like ceremonial deism, they leave a gap in their analysis which must be 
filled. It is impossible to infer how Kramnick and Moore would decide these issues be-
cause even Roger Newman, who agrees that school prayer is unconstitutional, distin-
guishes ceremonial deism like “God save the United States and this honorable Court” 
from prayers in schools because, presumably, children’s minds are more impressionable 
than those of adults. See Newman, supra note 77, at 7. 
Even among those who would agree that prayer in schools and religious displays 
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further by questioning courtroom, congressional, or other pub-
lic ceremonial prayers.95 Perhaps the reason Kramnick and 
Moore do not address ceremonial deism is because it is such a 
controversial issue. Ceremonial deism is tightly woven into the 
fibers of American culture. The feeling that we are a nation 
chosen by and favored of God contributes to the country’s 
strong patriotism.96 Next to a declaration that we are a nation 
under God, or even God’s nation, apple pie pales in its ability to 
inspire national pride and feelings of security and safety. And 
so the authors join with the courts in sidestepping what would 
be a painful and messy surgical process, threatening the na-
tion’s identity and offending many. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The authors of The Godless Constitution: The Case Against 
Religious Correctness bring two claims against the Religious 
Right. First, they claim that its intense political involvement 
violates the intent of the framers who sought to keep religion 
and politics separate. Second, they claim that by making a po-
litical candidate’s religious beliefs an issue, the Christian Right 
endorses the use of an informal religious test which violates the 
Constitution. 
In these two ways, the authors assert that groups like the 
Christian Coalition have overstepped their bounds and have 
penetrated the sacred wall between church and state.97 Thus, 
 
in government buildings are inappropriate, it is unlikely that most would agree to re-
move the motto “In God We Trust” from the nation’s currency, or to eliminate Christ-
mas as a national holiday. 
 95. The closest Kramnick and Moore come to addressing the issue of ceremonial 
deism in its various forms is when they state, “The framers erected a godless federal 
Constitutional structure, which was then undermined as God entered first the U.S. 
currency in 1863, then the federal mail service in 1912, and finally the Pledge of Alle-
giance in 1954.” KRAMNICK & MOORE, supra note 1, at 143. 
 96. In Kramnick and Moore’s opinion, the party of religious correctness “asks 
that we perpetuate in public rhetoric the notion that the United States is an instru-
ment of divine providence.” Id. at 174. 
 97. Even if The Godless Constitution is merely “an attempt to rail against the so-
called ‘religious’ or ‘Christian’ right,” as some complain, see Presser, supra note 16, at 
87-88, such criticism is not entirely unwarranted due to the extremism demonstrated 
by some religious groups, whose lack of tolerance of those with other beliefs clearly vio-
lates the Christian doctrines they profess of understanding and respect for others. See, 
e.g., Robert Dreyfuss, The Holy War on Gays, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 18, 1999, at 38; 
Berg, supra note 3, at 45 (“I want you to just let a wave of intolerance wash over you. I 
want you to let a wave of hatred wash over you. Yes, hate is good.”) (quoting Bob Cay-
lor, Terry Preaches Theocratic Rule, THE NEWS-SENTINEL (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Aug. 16, 
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The Godless Constitution serves the valuable purposes of alert-
ing the Christian Right that its claims to a Christian Constitu-
tion and a Christian nation are not well founded, and forcing 
individuals and politicians to consider the propriety of their 
own views and those of the Religious Right regarding the ap-
propriate distance between church and state.98 
Despite these strengths, the weaknesses of The Godless 
Constitution greatly decrease its ability to achieve the afore-
mentioned purposes. First, there is no remedy available for the 
claims Kramnick and Moore bring against the Religious Right. 
The limits the authors seek to place on the ability of religious 
leaders and adherents to publicly practice religion and express 
their beliefs have no legal basis. The authors’ implicit advocacy 
of self-censorship by religious leaders in public speech violates 
free speech principles, and is not mandated by the Constitu-
tion. Their criticism of the politically active Religious Right 
does not consider its value in balancing the unchecked Liberal 
 
1992, at 1A (quoting sermon by Randall Terry, the founder of Operation Rescue)). 
Statements like this from the extreme right couldn’t be farther from Jesus Christ’s in-
structions to “love one another” and “love your neighbour as yourself.” John 13:34-35 
(King James). 
There appears to be a temptation among members of the Religious Right to codify 
the doctrines of their churches in the law, so that people will not have a choice of how 
to live. By promoting prayer in schools, the church does not have to worry if the par-
ents in their congregations are not totally committed to teaching their children to pray 
in the home, because the state will take care of it. However, as Newman argues, 
“Prayer belongs in our churches, synagogues, and homes. If families did their job in 
this area, schools would not have to be involved. . . . ‘We have a very easy remedy,’ 
President Kennedy said after the school prayer case, ‘and that is to pray ourselves.’ ” 
Newman, supra note 77, at 10-11. 
In the majority of cases, the result the Religious Right seeks to achieve by involv-
ing government in religion is something the Religious Right could achieve itself. If 
children were taught creationism in the home along with evolution in school, there 
would be no need for lawsuits about the school curriculum of a science department. See 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). Therefore, the simple solution is for reli-
gious people to live their beliefs, rather than seeking to legislate the individual con-
science of Americans nation-wide in matters where no valid secular purpose is achieved 
by the law or policy at issue. 
 98. See Idleman, supra note 55, at 992. Idleman suggests that The Godless Con-
stitution serves three valuable purposes. First, it challenges the Religious Right’s his-
torical analysis of the origins of the Constitution, debunking their claim that this is a 
Christian nation with a Christian Constitution. Cf. Church of the Holy Trinity v. 
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (wherein Justice Brewer states: “this is a 
Christian nation”). Second, it empowers citizens to scrutinize their own views on the 
interaction of religion and politics. Third, it aids “government officials subject to the 
influences of the Religious Right” in evaluating “the propriety of those influences in 
relation to the interpretation and execution of their public obligations.” Idleman, supra 
note 55, at 992. 
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Left and paints the entire religious community as extremists, 
rather than considering the valuable contributions of moderate 
religious adherents in politics. In addition, the authors’ argu-
ment that religious Americans have created an informal reli-
gious test clause for their leaders does not recognize a voter’s 
right to consider a candidate’s religion, if a voter so chooses. 
Second, critical omissions in The Godless Constitution seri-
ously limit its value. Kramnick and Moore do not recognize 
that the prohibitions placed on the Federal Government by the 
Establishment Clause were not meant to apply to states and 
individuals. Further, the authors sidestep such controversial 
issues as ceremonial deism, and opine instead on issues which 
have already been decided by the Supreme Court to their satis-
faction. For these reasons, Kramnick and Moore’s “Case 
Against Religious Correctness” must be dismissed for “failure 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”99 
Melissa A. Dalziel 
 
 99. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
